The Sword of St. Michael by Guy LoFaro

Author:Guy LoFaro
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Da Capo Press
Published: 2011-08-08T16:00:00+00:00

Gavin could see that Chisholm’s troopers were reeling from their near escape from Beek, though they had some fight left. During their withdrawal they knocked out a German half-track in an S-turn farther down Berg en Dal’s slope, thereby precluding other enemy vehicles from negotiating the steep, winding road to the summit and negating, at least temporarily, the enemy armor threat. But even with no enemy armor to worry about, Lieutenant Colonel Louis Mendez, the 3/508th commander and the man responsible for defending Berg en Dal, told Gavin that he would be hard pressed to do so.30

“As I understood the situation then, it was seriously in doubt,” Gavin later admitted, for were Berg en Dal to fall, the Germans “could have walked into the outskirts of Nijmegen almost unmolested, our forces on that front were so thin.”31 Gavin told Mendez that he would get all the artillery support he needed and that, if he could hold the night, he would be reinforced with more infantry. But in reality Gavin had nothing left. All of his infantry battalions were already committed, the promised arrival of the 325th was soon dashed, and three of the division’s artillery battalions were supporting fights elsewhere, leaving only the 319th available to support Mendez and the rest of the 508th. Moreover, artillery ammunition was running low. Hence, after reconsidering the situation, Gavin decided there was but one thing to do—counterattack.32

Gavin knew his enemy. He knew that the Germans did not like to fight at night, and therefore, if Mendez could hold on until then, he was “hopeful that the Germans, as they often did, would stop their attack at darkness.”33 This would give him time to send a force around the Germans fronting Berg en Dal with the aim of retaking Beek. Even if the attack was unsuccessful, Gavin was certain that by merely threatening Beek he would discomfit the German attack at Berg en Dal by forcing the Germans to withhold forces to defend Beek that they otherwise would have used to attack Berg en Dal. He would be proved right on all points.

At 1900 hours, 20 September, Lieutenant Louis G. Toth, the H Company, 3/508th, commander, received a warning order to take Beek, drive through it, and set up a defensive line 1,000 yards northeast of the town. He was also told that Beek was lightly defended, but two antitank gunners from the 80th Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion who had been with Chisholm’s force told Toth this was not so, contending instead that there were at least four hundred Germans in the town along with half-tracks and other armored vehicles. With the two antitank gunners as guides, Toth led his force to Beek expecting a fight, but when he arrived at its outskirts undetected and with no sign of the enemy, he could not help but be confused. When he sent his First Platoon into Beek to take a look around, his confusion vanished. German machine guns lying in ambush opened up, killed the platoon leader, and pinned the rest of the platoon down.

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